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Risks of Privacy-Enhancing 
Technologies: Complexity and 
Implications of Differential 
Privacy in the Context of 
Cybercrime
William Stadler
Abstract
In recent years, the swift expansion of technology-enabled data harvesting has 
infiltrated modern life and led to the collection of massive amounts of private data. 
As a result, the preservation of individual privacy has become a salient concern for 
the general public. Combined with an increase in the frequency and prevalence of 
cybercrime, more of the public now face the very real risk of privacy loss associated 
with illegitimate use of private data. Differential Privacy has emerged as a relatively 
new privacy-preserving method with the potential to significantly reduce the likeli-
hood of harmful data disclosures stemming from malicious use. However, research 
has not explicitly investigated Differential Privacy from the perspective of criminal 
justice or examined the utility of Differential Privacy as a possible situational crime 
prevention measure to cybercrime. Therefore, this chapter explores the proliferation 
of cybercrime through advances in technology and briefly examines other privacy-
preserving methods before discussing the possible use of Differential Privacy as a 
viable countermeasure to cybercrime. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
several practical considerations related to the use of Differential Privacy as a tool in 
the fight against cybercrime and offers recommendations for future research.
Keywords: cybercrime, Differential Privacy, privacy-enhancing technologies, 
technology-enabled crime, situational crime prevention
1. Introduction
The production and consumption of data has been increasing with the ubiquity 
of the internet [1], and with this, the benefits that accompany innovations and 
advances in computing technology, such as those stemming from artificial intel-
ligence and machine learning, are increasingly relevant to a growing number of 
industries and applications [2]. However, our reliance on technology and consumer 
connectedness, coupled with rapid growth in the aggregation and liquidity of per-
sonalized data, has made us more vulnerable to cybercrime victimization and the 
malicious use of private data [3, 4]. The challenge of securing confidential informa-
tion is becoming one of the key issues in our digital world [5].
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Recently developed privacy-enhancing technologies and methods are being 
touted as possible solutions to mitigate privacy risks associated with inadvertent 
disclosure and guard against sinister data incursions resulting from cybercrime. 
One such possibility is Differential Privacy [6], which represents a new security 
paradigm designed to meet the growing number of privacy risks which accom-
pany data stewardship, particularly for those entrusted with safeguarding data. 
Differential Privacy was conceived to simultaneously harness the power of informa-
tion contained in “big data” while substantially reducing the likelihood of harmful 
data disclosures resulting in possible malicious use [7].
The commercial benefits and costs of privacy enhancing technologies have been 
widely studied, particularly as consumer data sharing and consumption has grown 
through distributed systems and Internet of Things (IOT) devices and applications 
such as smartphones, televisions, medical equipment, appliances, and wearables. 
However, because of its emergence as a promising new approach to computational 
analysis, far less has been written about the implications of Differential Privacy, 
including the merits and limitations of the sophisticated techniques created in the 
context of this definition. Similarly, research aimed at the advantages, pitfalls, and 
practical challenges of adopting differentially private approaches has been limited. 
Literature on Differential Privacy has yet to explore the applied use of this privacy-
preserving approach in the context of contemporary crime and justice threats, 
including cybercrime. Scholarship has generally tended to avoid important, and 
arguably necessary, cross-disciplinary collaborations between technical science dis-
ciplines such as computer science and social science disciplines like criminal justice.
Therefore, through the lens of the criminal justice discipline, this chapter will 
explore the use of Differential Privacy as a possible cybercrime prevention tech-
nique in the context of the massive digital ecosystem that has emerged over the last 
two decades. We begin with a discussion of the recent proliferation of cybercrime 
that has arisen through advances in technology, followed by a brief examination 
of evolving privacy protections which led to the rise of differential privacy, as 
both a general tenet and assortment of techniques for advancing data security. We 
then speculate on the use of Differential Privacy as a situational crime prevention 
countermeasure to cybercrime, and review potential challenges to its use. The 
chapter concludes with an attempt to stimulate future research and interest in 
cross-disciplinary exploration of this relatively new privacy-enhancing approach, 
particularly with respect to its potential to reduce risk, combat crime, and preserve 
the confidentiality of data for consumers and those most vulnerable to cybercrime 
victimization.
2. The proliferation of cybercrime through technology
As the general public engages more with online environments and participation 
in connected routines that produce personal data becomes more common to every-
day life, new criminal opportunities emerge in the form of cybercrime [8]. Though 
the concept of cybercrime is open to interpretation and has resulted in several 
competing definitions, broadly defined, cybercrime involves technology-related 
offending that takes place in the online environment [9] and is “committed using 
a computer, network, or hardware device” [10]. More importantly, cybercrime 
represents a serious economic and national security threat to the United States and 
to other countries around the world [11, 12]. Research has revealed that theft of 
private data through cybercrime is continuing to grow [1], resulting in a substantial 
need for promising new definitions and approaches, as well as new laws [13], aimed 
at the protection of personal data and individual privacy. Differential Privacy is one 
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of many approaches with the potential to prevent or significantly blunt the harmful 
consequences associated with cyber criminality by influencing the means through 
which organizations and agencies protect sensitive information from exploitation 
and malicious use. Yet, cybercrime itself has largely remained on the periphery of 
the criminology discipline as a marginalized topic [3], and research on information 
security in the context of cybercrime has remained limited as a result, perhaps 
because of the complexities associated with the crimes and spatial and temporal 
distance between offenders and victims [13]. Further, research in crime and justice 
literature on both the theoretical and practical use of technical privacy methods, 
such as Differential Privacy, is virtually non-existent.
Meanwhile, the spread of data-driven technologies are generating a multitude of 
ways for public and private-sector entities to induce the creation and dissemination 
of personal data which also inadvertently enables cybercriminals access to informa-
tion that people would rather keep to themselves. Ironically, the recent trend toward 
distributed computing and the decentralization of control and access to smaller 
computer systems and network resources has also increased the likelihood of cyber-
crime [14]. Once data have been generated and exist somewhere, the malicious use 
of that data becomes more likely, creating greater potential for victimization and 
harm to individuals and to organizations alike. Thus, two related issues become 
tantamount when considering the practical utility of Differential Privacy as one of 
many possible countermeasures to cybercrime. First, it is important to understand 
how cybercrime threats are evolving and expanding to ensure that subsequent 
prevention and interdiction measures are designed with specific cybercrime threats 
in mind. Second, it is also necessary to consider how detection and attribution capa-
bilities have evolved in relation to the changing threat landscape so that cybercrime 
enforcement and investigation methods also meet changing demands.
2.1 Threat expansion and evolution
The world community has been increasingly expressing concern about the use 
of advanced computing and AI for criminal purposes [15]. And in recent years, 
advances in technology have undoubtedly increased the frequency and prevalence 
of cybercrime activity, resulting in an expansion of possible threats to systems and 
data worldwide [13]. Given the breadth of information captured and widely avail-
able today about each individual on earth, people might assume that the magnitude 
of the internet and related “systems” as well as volume of data being transmitted 
provides adequate protection against disclosures of personal data. Individuals 
sharing this view may also conclude that the odds of becoming a victim are low 
and that more robust technical countermeasures to cybercrime are unnecessary. 
However, this perception is a fallacy; vulnerability to victimization is not uniformly 
distributed, nor are contemporary acts of cybercrime targeted only at single persons 
or entities. The size and scale of cybercrime capabilities and efforts has increased 
commensurate with advances to computing power and precision, perhaps resulting 
in modern cyber-predators posing greater risk to larger groups of individuals than 
ever before [15].
This fact is becoming more evident as the United States and other countries 
around the world grapple with increasingly serious cases of cybercrime which 
strain the integrity of data protection measures in both public and private sectors. 
Dozens of high-profile and illegal data breaches have occurred in the U.S. over the 
last handful of years that resulted in the compromise or theft of massive amounts 
of private information, including with eBay [16], JP Morgan Chase [17], Sony [18], 
Adobe, Equifax, and LinkedIn [19], as well as with U.S. political organizations [20] 
and voter registration records [21]. Highly sophisticated gangs, organized crime 
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groups, and terrorist organizations are also using computer and communication 
technologies to steal, smuggle, blackmail, sell drugs, and conduct a variety of 
other criminal activities on a much larger scale to finance their operations [22]. To 
be sure, cybercriminals are becoming more knowledgeable and skilled, and they 
appear to be systematically attacking larger and more sensitive databases with 
increasing brazenness and alarming frequency.
Recent advances in privacy technology have to some degree equipped data 
guardians with more tools to systematically prevent inadvertent data disclosures 
resulting from legitimate use. With respect to cybercrime, the contribution of 
new innovations has also enabled private corporations and government agencies, 
including those serving prevention, enforcement, or regulatory functions, to better 
deter, investigate, and detect instances of nefarious activity and cybercrime attacks 
resulting in privacy fissures. Yet, on the whole, governments and private entities 
frequently appear to be playing catch-up. Growth of distributed systems, AI, and 
novel privacy enhancing technologies which strengthen the capabilities of data 
producers and distributors have also produced unintended consequences, including 
conditions favorable to hostile actors gaining the motivation, means, and cover to 
access private information and conceal malicious activity [23]. Moreover, typical 
privacy protections have achieved limited success because they are inattentive to 
the opportunistic aspects of cybercrime [14]. Commonly deployed data protection 
tactics may generate a false sense of security while inadvertently softening crime 
targets by making them more attractive, accessible, and unguarded to allow cyber-
criminals opportunities to conceivably initiate attacks on private information more 
easily. The resulting “target softening” stems directly from the shift toward complex 
software, interconnected data networks, and distributed systems in the modern IoT 
infrastructure which remain inadequately guarded and vulnerable to penetration via 
more sophisticated techniques [5]. While innovations and capabilities advancements 
undoubtedly enable more sophisticated applications, they also enable adversaries to 
collect information and deliver exploits specifically tailored to target systems [24].
The frequency of hostile attacks will also likely increase as artificial intelligence 
capabilities become more powerful and widespread, evolving and expanding the 
very nature of existing cybercrime threats while simultaneously spawning new 
threats. Indeed, there is reason to expect that intrusions enabled by the growing use 
of AI among cybercriminals will be finely targeted at the complex vulnerabilities 
created by AI systems and become more effective at exploiting the weaknesses left 
in their wake [15]. The emergence of machine learning algorithms, in particular, has 
effectively boosted adversary capabilities to run complex and repeatable problem-
solving operations against unfortified positions without human intervention, 
providing cybercriminals with technical scalability and automation which has his-
torically been beyond their reach. The ability of cybercriminals to more intelligently 
and systematically assault numerous targets at once will likely exacerbate an already 
challenging problem facing cyber security practitioners in which criminals must 
only find one flaw in a vast system, whereas database and systems administrators 
must account for all possible weaknesses to protect system integrity [25]. Even the 
most inept cyber-criminal need only exploit a single path of vulnerability among 
the complex and increasing number of data ingestion points, whereas data guard-
ians face the increasingly difficult task of protecting against all conceivable threats 
to privacy [26].
2.2 Threat detection and attribution
While cybercrime offenses against privacy may in some ways be synonymous 
with traditional non-violent “street” crimes, such as those against property, because 
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they involve the theft, corruption, or destruction of assets held and valued by a 
property owner, there may be a tendency to address them like ordinary crimes. 
However, the nature of technology-based privacy crimes varies in several important 
ways. Chief among these is the fact that cybercrimes often carry an inherently 
lower risk of detection, due to significant spatial separation and temporal distance 
between offenders and victims. Additionally, privacy-related offenses may also be 
obscured due to their velocity, automation, and complexity [27]. Thus, the adop-
tion of new computing innovations and methods, such as machine learning, by 
cybercriminals will likely continue to challenge existing cybercrime detection and 
attribution methods. In particular, cyber-assaults against distributed systems may 
be of such increasing scale and complexity that forensic detection and attribution 
efforts will suffer markedly. Research has already shown cybercriminals to be savvy, 
having migrated away from easily detectable attacks that were recently common-
place toward more stealthy aggressions that are often indistinguishable [24].
For similar reasons, cybercrime threats will presumably expand and diversify 
as a natural byproduct of the automation computing innovations have permitted. 
In this regard, human capital costs of cybercriminals attempting intrusions into 
databases containing personal information are likely to decline as they leverage the 
scalable use of AI systems to complete tasks that would ordinarily require extensive 
human labor, intelligence and expertise. Those cost savings might naturally trans-
late into expanding the pool of actors with which to initiate attacks, increasing the 
rate at which attacks are carried out, and growing the set of prospective targets. 
Thus, the acquisition of AI capabilities among cybercriminals will expand their 
operations to spawn new attacks that would be otherwise impractical for humans. 
Malicious actors will purposely target and exploit the growing multitude of vulner-
abilities of AI systems deployed by those entrusted with stewardship and fortifica-
tion of data, thereby deepening the threat to the privacy of individuals represented 
in such data.
3. Evolving privacy methods
While the influence and intrusion of technology into the public sphere has 
unintentionally created new opportunities for cyber victimization, various 
approaches to counter emerging threats have developed and evolved out of privacy 
requirements engineering. These methods have enabled the design, analysis, and 
integration of security and privacy requirements during systems implementation 
for traditional and cloud architectures to better support and protect data [28]. 
Further, novel privacy definitions have been created, resulting in several systematic 
approaches to minimize the likelihood of unintended data disclosures. Differential 
Privacy represents one of the newest, and perhaps most promising, privacy defini-
tions aimed at preserving the privacy of individuals and groups whose data is pub-
lished and/or accessible for public- and private-sector research and data analysis, as 
well as product and service development and enhancement. Yet a variety of other 
techniques continue to persist.
3.1 Prior anonymization techniques
As the scale of consumable data generated by society has grown, so too have the 
mechanisms for shielding the information and individuals represented in such data. 
Historically, curators of large databases attempted to protect individual privacy 
through the de-identification of datasets using a variety of algorithmic data ano-
nymization techniques. These have included stripping or suppressing identifying 
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information such as names, dates of birth, and other personal information out of 
data that is released for consumption, or through replacement of some data values 
with generalized quasi-identifiers. In effect, the data elements generated from these 
processes have represented approximations of data or a broad category of values to 
achieve the property of “k-anonymity”—anonymization resulting from data that 
is indistinguishable from that produced by another individual in the same dataset 
[29]. Through these practices, curators reasonably believed anonymity could be 
assured—that personal identifiable information (PII) contained within the data 
could not be distinguished or used to discover the identity of individuals or groups 
of individuals represented in the data [30]. However, we now know that these 
earlier methods for protecting individual privacy have been afflicted with vulner-
abilities, resulting in “de-identified” datasets being prone to exploitation or attack, 
particularly where the value of sensitive attributes is not diverse enough or when 
sufficient background knowledge is known by would-be attackers [31]. In such cir-
cumstances, individuals might face unintentional risk of cybercrime victimization 
and identification resulting from inference attacks and algorithms deployed against 
databases to reconstruct case-specific identities through whatever limited, sensitive 
data is contained in a given database, or through the fusion of extracted data with 
external sources [32].
Numerous examples have been cited where de-identified data published for 
legitimate use was nevertheless systematically exploited to uncover individual 
identities (see [33–35]). Though some privacy breaches may not involve nefarious 
intent and therefore result in relatively benign consequences, the growing number 
of intentionally harmful and illegal privacy intrusions should elicit concern among 
privacy advocates and information security practitioners. Further, subsequent 
research has also revealed that not all k-anonymity algorithms provide uniform, 
privacy-preserving protections [36] and that some can inadvertently distort data 
to a point where both its integrity and utility are appreciably diminished [37]. 
Thus, it is clear that prior efforts to counter privacy risks have not gone far enough. 
While more recent techniques such as l-diversity and t-closeness have incremen-
tally advanced the security of personal-level data, they may also be vulnerable to 
exploitation as the liquidity of data and proliferation of artificial intelligence in 
today’s contemporary world continue to advance [38, 39]. Yet, despite these notable 
concerns, many of the deficient database de-identification techniques referenced 
above, which fail to truly anonymize participants and protect their confidentiality, 
continue to persist as commonplace practices in commercial industries and the 
larger research community [34].
3.2 Emergence of Differential Privacy
Recognizing the need for a more robust privacy approach, Differential Privacy 
was developed in the early 2000s. While it was not explicitly intended to guard 
against cybercrime, Differential Privacy represents a deliberate attempt to over-
come many of the foreseeable privacy challenges identified above by seeking true 
anonymity in datasets. With this definition and the use of differentially private 
processes, personal information can, in theory, be more adequately protected from 
cybercrime activity by avoiding the availability or release of raw data and instead 
enabling a replica database upon which queries are run containing modified (but 
statistically similar) versions of person-level data. Thus, Differential Privacy repre-
sents an enhanced level of privacy protection in the evolving data security model, 
resulting in virtually no disclosure risk. It achieves this by obscuring individual 
identities with the addition of mathematical “noise” to particular data elements, 
consequently concealing a small sample of each individual’s data [40]. According to 
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its proponents, Differential Privacy virtually guarantees that the removal or addi-
tion of a single database item does not appreciably affect the outcome or validity 
of any analysis. Stated another way, this data perturbation technique ensures that 
the probability of a statistical query producing a given result is virtually the same 
whether it is conducted on an unadulterated dataset or one containing modified 
or synthetic data [40]. Thus, the true benefit to Differential Privacy is that there 
is quantifiably lower risk associated with its use over alternative methods aimed 
at systematically safeguarding personal data. In turn, individuals’ data should be 
more rigorously defended from theft or illegitimate use when differentially private 
methods are used.
Because Differential Privacy was conceived as a more rigorous definition of 
anonymizing data and protecting confidentiality than prior methods, its popularity 
has grown in recent years, with several commercial entities enabling Differential 
Privacy algorithms for use on a massive scale for data generated in the private sec-
tor. For example, Apple has intentionally deployed Differential Privacy techniques 
to discover and analyze usage patterns of large numbers of iPhone users without 
compromising the privacy of individuals [40]. In this instance, Differential Privacy 
algorithms executed by Apple analyze iOS user data with the published goal of 
improving and enhancing end-user experiences with various iOS applications such 
as iMessage (text messaging), through which functions such as auto-correct, sug-
gested words and phrases, and emojis can become more intuitive [41]. In a similar 
example of commercial use, Google has employed Differential Privacy algorithms 
in its analyses of Chrome web-browser usage to discover the prevalence of malicious 
software hijacking computer and application settings without user knowledge [42].
There has even been expanded use of Differential Privacy in the public sphere, 
with the U.S. Census Bureau recently announcing its plan to more rigorously protect 
the confidentiality of individual-level data than in years past. Prior to the most 
recent census, this federal agency attempted to obscure person-level information 
by substituting raw data beneath the census block level with comparable data 
from another block to ensure the validity of population-level statistics. However, 
beginning with the 2020 Census, “noise” will be purposely injected into all data 
emanating below the state geographic level [43] to achieve “advanced disclosure 
protections” [44]. This instance of Differential Privacy use represents one of the 
first by a federal agency broadly responsible for the collection and provision of data 
for public use, and is likely to serve as a possible model for other federal, state, and 
local data stewards.
Given its intent, generally positive reviews, and notable use in a handful of 
public and private sector instances, it is somewhat remarkable that Differential 
Privacy has failed to gain widespread adoption as a data protection measure since 
its introduction in 2006. Though Differential Privacy has indeed become an infor-
mation security standard with database computation and analysis in computer 
science research, resulting in numerous algorithms aimed at strengthening privacy, 
practitioner adoption of Differential Privacy in applied settings has been slow to 
gain traction [45]. Similarly, while Differential Privacy has indeed spawned impor-
tant new lines of data privacy research, much of that work has been theoretical or 
simulated and proven to be less suitable for application to real-world situations [4]. 
To date there have been few empirical examinations of the practical application of 
Differential Privacy, despite the existence of important concerns surrounding its 
viability, including possible tradeoffs that arise between achieving heightened pri-
vacy protections and preserving the utility of data produced through differentially 
private queries [46]. Despite the obvious and substantial lag between the emer-
gence of Differential Privacy as a definition worthy of research and its acceptance 
as a pragmatic and commonly employed approach in real-world scenarios, it is 
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important to consider the relevance and utility of Differential Privacy as a pos-
sible cybercrime countermeasure in anticipation that its use will someday become 
pervasive.
4. Cybercrime prevention through Differential Privacy
Though Differential Privacy is applicable to a number of industries and sce-
narios, its potential as a cybercrime prevention and risk mitigation measure is 
intriguing and warrants deeper exploration. From a criminological standpoint, dif-
ferentially private approaches might best be deployed as technical situational crime 
prevention (SCP) measures to deter prospective attacks against sensitive data, 
or at the very least, minimize their harms. Generally speaking, situational crime 
prevention represents a data-driven approach to reduce the physical opportunities 
for crime by concentrating on the specific conditions, settings, and circumstances 
which produce the conditions favorable to criminality [47]. Further, the approach 
explicitly suggests that crime prevention can only be accomplished by systemati-
cally analyzing the details of a given crime problem and then introducing strategies 
for blocking, reducing or removing the opportunities that enable a particular crime 
to take place [14]. Thus, the most viable strategy to combat crime is through the 
informed management, design, and manipulation of a particular environment that 
would ordinarily be conducive to crime [48]. While SCP has mostly been utilized to 
examine and respond to traditional forms of criminality, such as burglary, robbery, 
and theft, it has direct applicability to cybercrime, given that acts of cybercrime 
share many similarities with property crimes. By examining important contextual 
attributes associated with specific cybercrime events, such as the technical means 
and steps through which an attack on data may be committed and how a database 
containing private information may be made less attractive or be better protected, 
cybersecurity practitioners can develop competent proactive strategies to reduce the 
presence and attractiveness of criminal possibilities for would-be offenders [14].
Situational Crime Prevention efforts are generally intended to achieve three 
goals: increase the overall risk to criminals, increase the effort they would be 
required to expend to engage in a crime, and decrease the reward associated with 
an act of crime [49]. In practice, exploration of a given network or computerized 
system through the perspective of situational crime prevention might first enable 
the identification of various targets that represent higher-value for cybercriminals. 
In turn, those high-value targets would be the first and most likely to receive height-
ened privacy protections. For example, databases that contain sensitive information 
about individuals or groups which, if disclosed, might hold potential monetary 
value and likely result in physical or financial harm, would be ideal candidates for 
Differential Privacy protections. Once identified, possible cybercrime targets might 
be “hardened” and made less attractive through the intentional adulteration of data 
in an effort to obscure personal information. The intent of this tactic would be to 
reduce the likelihood of an attack, because the risk and effort for a cybercriminal 
initiating an assault on that target would be considerably greater than in situations 
where differentially private techniques are not used.
The act of safeguarding data clearly carries direct costs for data stewards and 
information security practitioners, but attacks against data also carry similar 
costs for the attacker, both in terms of the resources required to mount an attack 
and potential costs if an attack is detected and subsequently punished. Unless the 
expected return from an attack is greater than the risk-adjusted costs of the attack, 
the attack will be uneconomical and become a less attractive target for an offender. 
Thus, the injection of noise into an otherwise high-value, sensitive dataset through 
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Differential Privacy algorithms might ensure that attackers would have to work 
harder and still be unable to derive much, if any, value from stolen data, despite the 
data still remaining useful for legitimate purposes. As a data perturbation method, 
Differential Privacy stands to more securely protect the privacy of individuals and 
appreciably diminish the utility of the entire corpus of stolen data, thus negating 
an attacker’s reward motive. With advance knowledge of the use of differentially 
private techniques on high-value databases, cybercriminals might altogether be 
deterred from exerting the effort to wage an attack, given the minimal value of the 
data relative to the cost of waging such an attack.
5. Practical challenges
Despite confidence in Differential Privacy as a promising new tool in the war 
against cybercrime, it is not a panacea. A number of practical concerns remain that 
may slow the adoption of this approach in the near-term and challenge its use as a 
viable cybercrime countermeasure. Each of the following challenges should be exam-
ined more thoroughly to guide future decision-making for the use of Differential 
Privacy in real-world settings. Chief among these concerns are the trade-offs that 
accompany the use of Differential Privacy, specifically, where the costs associated 
with using differentially private methods are balanced against the benefits of doing 
so. Second, while the likelihood of privacy intrusions originating external to a given 
system might fall with the use of Differential Privacy, there is a possible shift in risk 
from external to internal threats that is likely to accompany the use of Differential 
Privacy in a variety of applied settings. Similarly, as use of Differential Privacy 
grows, adversaries will also be increasingly more likely to take advantage of advances 
in computing power, launching a virtual “arms race” between cybercriminals and 
those responsible for protecting sensitive data. Lastly, but perhaps most limiting 
for the use of Differential Privacy, particularly in crime and justice settings, there 
remains a very real concern about the practical challenge of resourcing the skilled 
human capital needed to develop, enable, and continually support Differential 
Privacy techniques.
5.1 Tradeoffs
An important implication of Differential Privacy is that its use results in two sig-
nificant tradeoffs that should be factored into decisions regarding whether, when, 
and how to use the method. In the first tradeoff, the validity or accuracy of a given 
set of data may be reduced with a corresponding attempt to increase privacy. For 
example, the near-guarantee of total anonymity in a dataset can only be attained at 
some proportional reduction to the utility of that dataset. This challenge is com-
monly referred to as the “privacy budget” [50]. In this regard, tipping the scales 
in favor of greater privacy protections by injecting noise into data will provide a 
clear privacy benefit to the individuals whose personal information is contained in 
a given database. However, the adulteration of data resulting from a differentially 
private technique may also unintentionally produce imprecise statistical measures 
of a given phenomenon and lead to invalid conclusions derived from analysis of the 
data. The risk associated with this situation is that conclusions drawn from adulter-
ated data under legitimate use scenarios, either by researchers or practitioners, 
might be faulty, because they are based on inaccurate data.
One cautionary example of this challenge is a pharmacogenetic study con-
ducted by Fredrikson et al. [50]. The research evaluated the clinical effectiveness 
of a commonly prescribed blood-thinner using machine-learning models, while 
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differentially private algorithms were enabled to significantly reduce privacy risk 
for study participants. While the study yielded success in appreciably reducing 
privacy risk for study participants, according to the data, that success came at an 
increased risk of patient adverse health events and mortality. Though the study 
itself was simulated to examine the impact of Differential Privacy on a real-world 
clinical situation, the possible implications are clear; using differentially private 
algorithms to produce synthetic data may lessen privacy risks, but consequently 
result in a variety of unintended consequences to the conclusions of research, or in a 
worst-case scenario, to the same people Differential Privacy is meant to protect.
In addition to the tradeoff concern relating to the privacy budget, Differential 
Privacy also requires a tradeoff between the costs of deploying the privacy protec-
tions and the relative value of the data assets being protected. The values of data 
assets differ widely. Some targets might contain high-value, sensitive information, 
such as personal identifiers, credit card information, passwords, social security 
numbers, and insurance information that can be used maliciously to steal an 
identity or file false Medicare claims. Cybercriminals would likely view these targets 
as attractive and initiate attacks against the databases to steal such information. 
Therefore, databases containing highly sensitive data need extremely high-assur-
ance protections. Other targets may contain personal data but of a less sensitive 
variety, including Netflix subscriptions, personal shopping preferences, search term 
use, or website visits. The value of these data may have lower transactional value 
for cybercriminals looking to exploit personal information. Thus, datasets con-
taining these sources of information would presumably require weaker assurance 
protections.
A scenario where both high-and low-value assets are guarded requires that 
hazard-based decisions be made about the effort devoted to protecting each set 
of assets from cybercriminals. For example, security practitioners should explore 
what must be done to sufficiently protect high-assurance assets from possible 
intrusion, and what minimum level of effort would be required to protect low-
assurance assets. Treating low-assurance assets the same as high-value would lead 
to the irrational use of resources. Therefore, practitioners should carefully consider 
tradeoffs to the privacy budget and efforts required to protect assets when choosing 
to implement differentially private approaches.
5.2 Shifting risk and the impending arms race
While the adoption of Differential Privacy techniques may provably strengthen 
defenses against traditional cybercrime threats directed at the theft of personal 
information from a database, their use may also coincide with a sizeable shift in 
where risks originate and how they evolve. For instance, there is already mounting 
concern among researchers and practitioners that new innovations and technol-
ogy advances will transform the very nature of systems integrity and vulner-
ability, particularly with the growth of artificial intelligence, which will result in a 
“double-barreled threat” to high-value data repositories [14, 51]. In the traditional 
cybercrime model, criminal threats are generally thought to arise from an external 
source, spatially distant from the data being protected. However, internal threats 
to systems and data are now garnering additional attention, as cybercrime attacks 
are being more frequently initiated by organizational insiders [52]. The growing 
likelihood and simultaneous nature of these dual threats significantly increases the 
effort necessary to keep an infrastructure and its data secure, which will represent a 
significant ongoing challenge for many industries and organizations already strug-
gling to provide robust information security [51].
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Further, as Differential Privacy continues its incremental expansion beyond 
the realm of research toward use in applied settings, the resources and costs 
required for enabling Differential Privacy and other sophisticated privacy 
protections will also evolve. So too will the costs for cybercriminals intent on 
defeating the stronger protections afforded by differentially private systems. 
Cybercriminals are already taking advantage of more powerful computational 
resources and sophisticated approaches, requiring the investment of data 
guardians to continue increasing proportionally to keep pace. As a result of the 
commodification of computing technology, there is a brewing cybercrime “arms 
race” where information security practitioners will be constantly expected to 
respond in tit-for-tat fashion to complex and powerful threats from hostile actors 
[53]. As a result, to avoid having information security devolve into a never-
ending game of “whack-a-mole” to combat emerging threats, individuals respon-
sible for data security policy and practice must develop comprehensive strategies 
for data management and the use of privacy-preserving tools like Differential 
Privacy. However, the creation of such policies requires careful consideration 
of the origin and nature of threats to the data for which organizations have 
responsibility.
5.3 Resource constraints
Finally, and despite its potential as an automated method of systematically safe-
guarding data, Differential Privacy, much like artificial intelligence (see [54]), will 
only be as useful as the skilled humans that enable and support it. Unfortunately, 
some of the most pressing information security concerns facing a majority of 
organizations today include the limited number of skilled security personnel 
employed and the number who are readily available for employment [54]. While 
Differential Privacy strategies offer the realistic promise of protecting data for 
organizations that cater to consumers, significant barriers to the implementation 
and use of advanced privacy-enhancing technologies remain for organizations and 
agencies in the public sector that curate data for the most vulnerable populations, 
such as patients, prisoners, the disabled, and juveniles. Differential Privacy use to 
date has taken place primarily in the private sector, within organizations that have 
the financial and intellectual resources to pursue novel and costly privacy protec-
tions. However, research suggests that federal agencies do not have the relevant 
expertise or resourcing to implement differential privacy for the data they curate 
[55]. This is evident in the fact that to this point the U.S. Census Bureau is the only 
federal agency known to have initiated a systematic effort to employ Differential 
Privacy with the data it curates. The increasing sophistication of prospective cyber-
criminals and growing complexity of privacy enhancing technologies, including 
Differential Privacy algorithms needed to protect sensitive data, requires a level 
of data security expertise and sophistication that is simply not readily available 
throughout the federal public sector. In turn, this limitation is likely to be ampli-
fied at the state and local agency level, where funding for and expertise in skilled 
information security personnel are even more severely restricted than with the 
federal government.
Though expertise and a skilled labor force will become more common with the 
pervasiveness of Differential Privacy and other privacy-preserving technologies, it 
is sure to take time. And even then, organizations in the public sector may continue 
to face the difficulty of competing against private sector organizations to hire 
and retain personal capable of developing and enabling the use of robust privacy 
measures on vulnerable data.
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6. Conclusion
This unprecedented era of technology “connectedness” and “big data” has 
virtually assured that we will never be left entirely alone, and that our views of 
privacy will be forever changed by the digital means through which we now interact 
with the world around us [56]. Similarly, this new way of life raises the ever-present 
specter of devastating privacy risks resulting from cybercrime that compromises or 
steals the personal data we all generate and share. Given its potential as a pragmatic 
tool for organizations and data stewards in the war against growing cybercrime 
threats, Differential Privacy fits well within a situational crime prevention frame-
work and possibly represents a model to guide future privacy requirements engi-
neering and protections directed exclusively at the issue of cybercrime. Therefore, 
policymakers and practitioners would be well-served to engage in empirical explo-
ration of the implications that Differential Privacy and situational crime prevention 
collectively have on existing and new forms of cybercrime that are likely to emerge 
in the future.
Notwithstanding the practical challenges identified above, there is a continu-
ing need for exploration and development of data privacy and disclosure methods 
that match our shifting data culture and also maintain the public’s trust in institu-
tions and industries [4]. The pursuit of these aims can be achieved through greater 
consideration of securing software systems early in development and implementa-
tion lifecycles and through a more dedicated focus on expanding privacy require-
ments engineering research [28, 57]. Additional attention should be directed more 
specifically at Differential Privacy as a unique design and implementation method. 
Research on the practical application and limitations of privacy enhancing 
technologies like Differential Privacy within the context of cybercrime remains 
necessary. In this regard, future studies might wish to employ a “no-free-lunch 
theorem” and investigate some of the popular misconceptions about Differential 
Privacy and its vulnerabilities, such as making no assumptions about how data 
are generated, that it protects personal information despite an attacker having 
knowledge of other individuals represented in the data, and that it is defensible to 
arbitrary background knowledge [58]. Doing so would ensure that subsequent use 
of Differential Privacy does not inadvertently contribute to future privacy-related 
challenges.
Generally speaking, most research exploring risks to individual privacy have 
been aimed squarely at consumer protection in the private sector. And while the 
average consumer should be cautious about the risks associated with sharing data 
for commercial use, there are other groups for which data privacy becomes a more 
considerable challenge. Vulnerable populations such as patients, children, the 
indigent, the elderly, inmates, undocumented immigrants, the civilly committed, 
and the mentally ill, are some of the most frequently studied populations, but are 
among the least likely to have the sufficient protections from data privacy intru-
sions. Efforts should be made to correct this imbalance by finding opportunities to 
make costly privacy-enhancing technologies available to public sector agencies.
There is also a significant need and opportunity for cross-disciplinary col-
laboration with respect to cybercrime and privacy-related research. Scholars from 
technical and social science disciplines are encouraged to join forces to expand the 
scope and breadth of research on the many threats to privacy which stem from 
cybercrime. They should also work together to investigate the variety of promis-
ing opportunities for preventing and responding to cybercrime threats, including 
Differential Privacy. Doing so would undoubtedly contribute to the development 
and spread of more appropriate and accessible approaches to the preservation of 
privacy.
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Ultimately, before moving forward with any Differential Privacy or any other 
privacy-enhancing technologies, data scientists, researchers, and practitioners 
should collaborate and carefully explore the consequences of this evolution in 
data protection. Additional resources and effort should be dedicated to the careful 
appraisal of privacy protections for person-level data in a variety of public and 
private scenarios. Failure to do so will likely result in more frequent and severe 
cybercrime breaches of critical infrastructure and significant privacy implications 
for individuals and groups whose data is widely available and easily accessible.
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